core moral commitments must be found as a basis for the compromise, and the means of doing so must be motivated by an acceptance of the legitimacy of disagreement.
The positive as well as the negative view has been evident in assessments of the Coalition. 12 Although the two Coalition party leaders tend to employ the negative view when talking to their own supporters, they resort to the positive view when appealing to each other.
In the first case, they suggest that compromise is a regrettable necessity but has been kept to a minimum. 13 In the second case, they argue that compromise has offered an opportunity to combine the best of both parties' visions. 14 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have related the negative and positive views of compromise to the campaigning and governing mindsets, and there is a degree of truth in that observation. 15 However, I wish to argue that even in a campaign the positive view is the more coherent and democratic of the two. The negative view only proves tenable in a limited, and increasingly unusual, set of circumstances.
In terms of my somewhat stylized depiction of the options following the 2010 UK election, it might appear that the negative view of compromise coincides more with 'the confidence and supply agreement' and the positive account more with the eventual Coalition.
To some extent, that impression proves well-founded. As I shall attempt to show below, the Coalition agreement probably would not have been possible without at least some elements of the positive view being adopted by the actors involved. However, it is not my intention to
defend Coalition government as morally superior to majority or minority government, let alone to suggest that this Coalition provided the best possible outcome for the 2010 election. I simply wish to defend the positive view as the most normatively appealing way to tackle the compromises that most people accept form an inevitable part of political life. After all, even a party enjoying a parliamentary majority may need to compromise with certain factions on its own side to get particularly contentious measures through. Yet the negative view will always regard such compromises as regrettable and slightly dirty. By contrast, the positive view will treat them as part and parcel of a pluralist and democratic society, in which disagreement and diversity are facts of life. I do not deny that parties can be divided in ways that make the positive approach impossible and that there are dirty and even rotten compromises. 16 Nevertheless, pace the negative view, I shall argue that compromises are more likely to prove unsatisfactory and unsavoury the more they are tackled from the negative as opposed to the positive perspective.
The central claim is that the negative view of compromise rests on a misconception of the democratic process. It latches on to certain apparent paradoxes in the notion of compromising that reflect those posed by democratic theory more generally, and within representative democracy in particular. However, the negative view's favoured approach -of minimal compromise -actually compounds rather than resolves these dilemmas. At the heart of the problem lies what I shall call the 'representation paradox', which parallels the paradox in the theory of democracy noted many years ago by Richard Wollheim. 17 Wollheim's paradox consisted of the dilemma of a committed democrat who believes A ought to be done when the democratic majority holds that B ought to be done, and thereby finds him or herself believing that both A and B ought to be done, even if A and B are incompatible with each other. 18 The representation paradox develops this point further and has two aspects: the first on the side of the represented, the second on that of the representative. 19 With regard to the represented, compromise suggests that voters are potentially not simply caught between being committed to the view they may have voted for, on the one hand, and the process of democratic voting, on the other, as Wollheim observed. They are also caught between the views that the representative they voted for pledged to uphold on their behalf and the views he or she actually puts into practice. As a result, the represented may feel that their vote truly counts for nothing. Meanwhile, representatives can find themselves having been elected to do one thing -and presumably believing that policy to be the right one -yet having to do something else. In each case, the fact of compromise arguably compromises the integrity of both the agents involved -the citizen in one case and the politician in the other.
I shall set about dissolving this paradox as follows. In the first section I criticize the paradoxical position implied by the negative view whereby compromises are more likely to be principled if they are pragmatically motivated and moral principles and ends are excluded as far as possible from the compromise. According to this line of thinking, to compromise on moral grounds risks being incoherent, suggesting one should think it right to do what one believes to be wrong, while a compromise of moral ends and principles risks being either unprincipled or implies moral correction -that both sides have modified their views because they have come closer to a consensus on what is morally fairer or more just for them to do, in which case neither is compromising at all. 20 Against this position, I distinguish a 'shallow' compromise based on trading and bartering from a 'deep' compromise that has the mutual modification of ends and principles at its core. The first type of compromise can be purely pragmatic and instrumental, but it proves difficult for the second type to be so without involving some moral acceptance of the legitimacy of the different views involved in the disagreement. However, such acceptance need not signal incoherence, a lack of principle or moral correction, merely that both parties find reasons within their own moral views for conceding something to each other. While certain avoidance strategies of what I call 'trimming' and 'segregation' may be needed to protect those areas where no compromise is available, most political compromise cannot but involve the ends and principles of those involved and have them at its core. For they define the contours of the policies we favour and the ways they might be traded or bartered. As a result, compromise will often need to be moral rather than purely pragmatic in both substance and process, since it will rest on a degree of reciprocity and mutual recognition between the parties concerned.
The second section then turns to the way in which accepting the authority of democratic decision-making itself implies such a moral acceptance of the need for compromise. Indeed, that very moral acceptance lies behind the standard solution to the Wollheim paradox. Democracy involves accepting disagreement and distinguishing one's own view as a contribution to that disagreement from the democratic outcome as a resolution of that disagreement. One way of characterizing this acceptance is to see democracy as a means for promoting a fair compromise which accords equal respect and concern to different views without assuming any consensus between them. The democratic process arranges compromises between people who all believe that they are entitled to live by their own conception of the good but need to reach some collective agreements to do so. The aggregative aspect of democracy suggests that it does this in a purely mechanical way, but democracy also has its deliberative phase. As such, it builds on deep as well as shallow compromise in order to forge the coalitions needed to win elections, even in a plurality system.
The third section then argues that compromise between representatives becomes more rather than less legitimate the deeper it goes. The representation paradox derives from a delegatory model of representation, which gets caught on the horns of Wollheim's dilemma and allows at best for the shallowest of compromises. On this account, representatives are tied to specific policy commitments to which they should stick as far as possible. The assumption is that deep compromise only proves possible on the trustee model that divorces 24 In the first type, compromise is instrumental and restricted as far as possible to policy issues, in the second type compromise is moral and involves a degree of mutual respect for, and accommodation of, the different principles and ends of the parties involved.
'Shallow' compromises involve a trade-off. The simplest trade-off is to 'split the difference'. If a buyer is bargaining with a trader in the market over the price of a hat, he may prefer paying £10 to £20, and the trader may prefer that he pay £20 rather than £10. However, so long as the buyer feels paying £15 is better than having no hat, and the trader sees £15 as better than making no sale, they can compromise simply by splitting the difference. 25 pears. Yet, even if Jane regards one of her apples as equivalent to one of John's pears whereas John thinks his pears are worth two of her apples, the compromise is possible
because each wants what the other has enough to make concessions. Likewise, a political compromise may be possible if certain of each group's most favoured policies are ones that the other groups feel less strongly about. In such cases, they too may be able to barter, including in their common programme, say, the housing policy favoured by one group and the school policy favoured by another. Log-rolling classically takes this form. Note, though, that, like trading, bartering is instrumental and can be both immoral and amoral. The parties need not attempt to understand each other, nor need the deal be particularly fair -one party may be at a considerable advantage to the other and use that advantage to get more than the other does, whether they deserve to do so or not. All the parties need do is to discover a point that will satisfy their exogenously defined preferences sufficiently for each to feel a deal is better than no deal.
However, people tend to support given policies not simply as matters of 'pure'
preference -be it mere taste or self-interest -but also for normative reasons. A 'deep' compromise may be possible, though. Deep compromises involve reasoning about principles as well as policies. Individual preferences are not taken as fixed and exogenous, with the aim being to maximize their satisfaction. Rather, our preferences reflect reasons that can be modified to accommodate the reasons of others through the process of debating and negotiating with them. Indeed, it is only through mutual modifications at the level of principle that a joint policy position can be built. Say the reasons that Party A has for prioritizing a certain policy towards schools is a theory about equality of opportunity that leads its proponents to be opposed to most forms of welfare redistribution, while Party B sees housing as a priority precisely because it hold that more welfare-friendly view of equality. In this situation, any attempt to combine their policies will require that they also to some degree combine their respective reasoning about them too. Such a combination can be some way short of a consensus. Each, though, may be moved to find ways to accommodate some of the reasons of the other side that are congruent with their own reasoning. For example, Party B may not have seen scholarships to private schools as the best way of improving the educational prospects for poorer sections of society, but nonetheless acknowledge that there is a meritocratic strand to their own line of reasoning that can accommodate such a policy.
Likewise, Party A may regard certain forms of social housing as akin to a 'scholarship' -a step on the housing ladder for deserving, hard-working families -and approve increased spending in this area on that basis. In these cases, compromise becomes possible because neither side is simply adopting an instrumental and pragmatic approach. Each is attempting to appreciate to some degree the moral reasoning of the other side by relating it to similar reasoning of their own. There is a core of substantive mutual moral appreciation at the heart of the compromise that nonetheless falls short of mutual moral correction or consensus.
'Shallow' compromises have elements in common with what Rawls calls a 'modus vivendi', while a 'deep' compromise has affinities with his idea of an 'overlapping consensus'. 28 As with a 'modus vivendi' a shallow compromise depends on a contingent balance of forces between the parties involved, leading them to rub along together. But each looks to break the agreement as soon as it is advantageous to do so. Thus, such arrangements need not be either particularly equitable or stable. By contrast, a deep compromise involves the parties showing a degree of equal concern and respect for each other. They seek to acknowledge and accommodate the views of the others. Yet, unlike Rawls's 'overlapping consensus', such agreements remain within, and are sustained by, politics. Rawls believed that political interaction depended on removing certain basic principles from the sphere of political debate as common ground rules. 29 By contrast, these rules can be seen as the continuing focus of ongoing political compromise. For example, Liberal Democrats and Conservatives disagree about constitutional rights and the electoral system and, as we shall see, had to reach a compromise on both in the Coalition agreement.
The option of a minority government, as described at the start of this article, can be built round a shallow compromise. Each party to it can adopt purely instrumental reasoning.
However, it would be a classic 'modus vivendi' and prone to unravel fairly quickly as soon as one of the parties believed it electorally advantageous to opt out. To avoid this possibility, the Coalition Agreement had as a central plank a commitment by both parties to govern together for a full parliamentary term. However, to make that credible, they had to forge a common programme of government, for which a deep compromise became necessary. Thus, the Coalition Agreement begins by enunciating three shared principles -freedom, fairness and responsibility -that provided the common ground for their programme. Yet, as has become clear in debates over reform of the National Health Service (NHS), the parties diverge considerably in their interpretation of them. However, because each accepted that reference to these principles creates valid reasons for a given policy proposal, it became possible for each side to make mutual concessions at the level of policy. 30 For instance, there is a common language of dispersing power away from the centre and upholding the rights of individuals against the state. This allowed the parties to adopt the Conservative's policies of planned cuts in public sector spending, welfare to work programmes and other measures that sought to reduce state interference and promote market initiatives. However, it also supported the Liberal Democrat policies that emphasized local democracy and control, such as improving the voice of patients in NHS decisions, and even the pupil premium for disadvantaged children, which goes directly to schools rather than via local education authorities and could be seen in a similar meritocratic light to Conservative policies for fostering entrepreneurship.
Analogous overlapping reasoning allowed Conservatives to postpone their preferred tax cut of raising the threshold for inheritance tax to prioritize the Liberal Democrats' favoured policy of raising the threshold for income tax.
Of course, there may be areas that prove not to be amenable to either a shallow or a deep compromise. In these cases, the parties will seek to find ways of agreeing to disagree by adopting strategies of 'trimming' or 'segregation'. Trimming involves reducing the expression of dissent to a level that allows for coexistence. In the Coalition Agreement between the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives, for example, the strategy of 'trimming' was adopted for marriage/civil partnership tax breaks, the commissioning of nuclear power stations and higher education funding. In these areas, Liberal Democrat MPs can abstain in parliamentary votes and speak but not vote against government policy, thereby making it possible that these measures will pass while allowing the MPs to voice and maintain their opposition to them. The Liberal Democrats also dropped their opposition to replacing the Trident missile-based nuclear weapons programme but were allowed to propose alternatives.
Likewise, segregation seeks to isolate the issue from the rest of the programme, either by handing it over to a third party or postponing it altogether. The Coalition government set up some 11 'independent' commissions to review various policies, from the possible drafting of a British Bill of Rights to the review of public sector pensions, with the aim of providing a non-partisan (as opposed to a bi-partisan) view of a potentially contentious policy. The
Liberal Democrats' proposal of the alternative vote system was initially a trimming of their preference for proportional representation. They had hoped that this move might enable a barter or trade-off with the Conservatives in exchange for their proposal to redraw constituency boundaries, since both could be justified (albeit on different grounds) as making votes fairer. 31 However, the decision to put it to a referendum operated as a segregating device in handing that decision to the electorate rather than Parliament and allowing MPs of each party to campaign on either side. The debt crisis also allowed certain costly and potentially divisive policies to be trimmed from the agenda, notably the Liberal Democrat pledge to abolish student fees, or segregated and parked until the distant future, such as the Conservatives' promise on stamp duty. These concessions were presented as compromises dictated by the economic climate rather than collaboration with another party. and so were not really compromises but a matter of facing facts.
In describing somewhat summarily the character of the compromise that lies behind the Coalition Agreement, I do not wish either to criticize or to endorse it, but merely to illustrate what political compromise involves. The key feature is that compromise only works to the extent that participants feel that the compromise policy relates to principled and other moral reasons they hold. Shallow compromises can be non-principled, but for that very reason prove elusive. Similarly, trimming and segregation allow participants to avoid changing their reasons, but they have to be used sparingly or there would be no common programme at all. At some stage, therefore, compromise must go deeper and involve mutual changes in the different parties' reasoning too, so that they can agree on an overlapping substantive moral core -albeit one that is itself built around a deep compromise. What I now wish to suggest is that such changes require a democratic ethos which can be related in its turn to resolving both Wollheim's paradox in the theory of democracy and the related representation paradox. </bi> <H1>DEMOCRACY AS COMPROMISE</h1> <BNI>The defining circumstances for compromise are the existence of disagreement in conditions where a collective agreement is desirable and none of the parties is able to coerce the others into accepting their own favoured view. These are also the circumstances of democratic politics. Much as any theory of justice must assume conditions of relative scarcity, rough equality between the parties involved and conflicting plans of life, without which a theory of justice would neither be necessary nor possible, 32 so a theory of democracy assumes disagreement and the need to resolve it in an equitable, uncoerced manner so as to reach a collective decision. 33 We look to a theory of justice to take moderate scarcity as the normal human condition and offer an account of how we might divide a pot that will always be insufficient to meet all the conflicting demands that are made on it. Wishing that condition away removes the need for a theory of justice in the first place. Likewise, we need a theory of democratic politics that takes disagreement about justice as a fact of life and offers an account of how collective decisions might be legitimately made despite that situation.
Moreover, much as justice also requires certain conditions that not only make a just decision necessary but possible, so democracy also assumes a certain rough equality between citizens so that none can simply impose their view on others, or at least an acceptance that such an imposition would be illegitimate. and is my contribution to the disagreement. 35 Peter Singer has remarked that accepting a democratic process to resolve this disagreement is 'a paradigm of a fair compromise'. 36 That view needs some qualification. If democracy involves a shared conception of fairness, then acceptance of democracy is not itself a matter of compromise. Instead, there is a consensus that democracy is a fair way of settling disagreements. At best, it provides a moral side constraint on compromise -that when we vote on whether to accept a compromise, say, we will adopt a democratic procedure. 37 However, a more plausible version of Singer's formulation arises if democracy is seen as a mechanism that allows for compromise through being a process characterized by mutual respect whereby each seeks to respond to the views of others without giving up their own. In submitting to the process, no voter need change their views or concede to others. There is an acceptance that all are entitled to disagree and that we must reach collective agreements in ways that respect our disagreements. We can term this the underlying ethos of democracy. conditions. This response cannot be regarded as seeking the `best' balance of views through mutual moral correction, because no such `optimal' position exists -or at least is accessible to us given the limits of practical reason. Instead, citizens and politicians morally respond to the fact of pluralism through a politics that accords with the democratic ethos. So-called nonmajoritarian electoral systems, that is those systems that use some form of PR rather than plurality voting and even institutionalise proportionality in the administrative structures, as consociational systems do, effectively institutionalise compromise in this way as a means of accommodating pluralism. 42 In such systems compromise helps construct a collective good by bringing all sections of society together.
Within those pluralist societies that endorse the democratic ethos, therefore, reaching collective decisions will almost always involve compromise so as to mitigate disagreement sufficiently in order to produce workable, mutually respectful, collective decisions. At the very least, a majority will need to be constructed from various coalitions of minorities. 43 In a mass democracy this occurs to a large degree through party leaders devising programmes with broad electoral appeal. In favourable circumstances, that can be achieved by a relatively shallow compromise. Under conditions where voters' preferences can be aligned along a single dimension -standardly left-right -party competition should lead to convergence on the median voter, which has been shown to be the Condorcet winner. 44 In other words, the most electorally appealing policy package would be the one containing those policies that a majority of people would rank most highly had they been able to do so. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that many if any will get their most favoured policies. Instead, they will need to compromise and settle for their second or third best. Take the example in Table 1 <BI>In this example, the plurality winner would be 'c', since it is the first preference of the most people. However, the Condorcet-winner is 'a', since it emerges as the majority preference when its ranking is compared against each of the alternatives. As Albert Weale has observed, the Condorcet-winner 'captures the idea of a majority converging around a compromise solution where there are divergent ideal preferences'. 45 Increasingly, though, the political divisions of contemporary democracies cannot be modelled in this way. As I noted, people's preferences and hence their principles are multidimensional. New cultural, ethnic, gender and other cleavages have overlaid the old left-right divide, while new issues, from global warming to stem-cell research, arise that unsettle hitherto dominant dividing lines. 46 In this situation deeper compromise becomes necessary.
Politicians cannot treat voters' preferences as fixed and merely seek to maximize the satisfaction of as many as possible. Too many of them prove conflicting and incompatible for that to be a plausible strategy for winning a majority. As a result, politicians must attempt to appeal to the reasons that lie behind voter preferences and to persuade them in part to modify those reasons in the manner explored in the previous section. In the UK, the Conservatives have had to struggle to bring together Europhiles and Europhobes, traditionalists and libertarians, climate change deniers and rural ecologists, and generally appeal to the middle of the electoral spectrum without losing too many from their more radical wings. A similarly eclectic mix can be found in all the main parties. As I noted, such pluralism has often motivated moves to PR and a more 'consensual' style of democratic politics, in which compromise is institutionalised. 47 In these more proportional electoral systems the multidimensional character of politics is reflected in a multiplicity of parties. Yet, if these parties aspire to be partners in a governing coalition, the reasoning behind their policies must be roughly congruent with the reasoning of a number of other parties. A workable coalition will only arise to the extent deep compromise proves possible.
In both the shallow and the deep version of a democratic compromise, therefore, 49 However, this solution rules out deep compromises. Therefore, to the extent we have seen these to be necessary; a different form of representation seems called for.
A standard assumption has been that, for representatives to be able to negotiate compromises about 'ends', they must act as 'trustees'. This is the position commonly ascribed to Edmund Burke. In his famous 'Speech to the Electors of Bristol', Burke explicitly disavowed the view that the electorate issued 'authoritative instructions' to their representatives. 50 For the representatives to be bound to represent the partial interests of their constituents, he argued, would be inconsistent with their role within Parliament as deliberators on the national interest. To do that, representatives had to be free to exercise their own judgement as to what was the best way both to pursue the interests of the Bristol voters, and to relate them to the interests of the country as a whole. That view clearly goes beyond deliberation about means to encompass the discussion of ends. Yet, it comes at a price. To be consistent with democracy, Burke's position must assume that politicians are selected for their good judgement rather than to represent the judgement of their constituents -a judgement that extends not just to the means whereby their interests might be best realized but also to whether those interests serve the best ends. If so, it then becomes mysterious how electors could be competent to choose their representatives and hold them to account. It also overlooks the degree to which campaigns do rest on reasoning among the electorate and with politicians. Indeed, it is precisely the claim to be a trustee in this Burkean sense that leads voters to distrust politicians and reject their compromises as illegitimate. They regard these compromises as attempts by politicians to substitute their reasoning for the reason of those who they ought to serve. Though politicians may claim to act for the public interest, if the public's express views on their interests are being disregarded in the process, the suspicion always will be that they are simply serving their own.
Representation as replication is usually associated with forms of 'mirror' representation, often linked to a politics of presence that will allow the representative body to be 'an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large', able to 'think, feel, reason, and act like them'. 51 This aspiration has generally been thought impossible to fulfil in all respects.
The archetypal 'gay', 'lesbian', 'black', 'white', 'male' and so on proves a chimera. Yet, this aim also lies at the heart of the paradox raised by the very concept of representation, which seeks to make present what is not present. 52 Certain theorists have recently adapted this argument and given it a more limited and plausible application as the representation of citizen's political views as these emerge through the electoral process. 53 As with Christiano's account of delegation cited above, it is accepted that, as professionals, representatives have the advantage over most voters in having the time to become better informed about the issues than most of them can be. The election is rather an attempt by politicians to show how their various policy proposals relate to the views of citizens. For, pace Burke, voters participate in elections not to push their interests per se, but to express their views. 54 After all, as a different voter paradox has it, to vote simply to achieve a given policy would be irrational; the likelihood of your vote counting sufficiently to be worth going to the polls is too remote. 55 So the appeal of representatives lies in their thinking like their voters -in their being likeminded in their reasoning. 56 Representation conceived in this way does not require that one represents how everyone in a polity thinks about every single issue. Nor does it involve duplicating how they reason in all spheres of life. Rather, it involves seeking to represent the main modes of thinking about political issues -those with significant support -in ways that are roughly proportionate to their distribution among the populace. As far as that is the case, it will be legitimate for representatives to legislate in ways that continue the process of deep compromise that forms a necessary part of any successful election campaign. That is, they can reason on politics 'as' their voters, not just about means but also about the ends that they share with them, applying this reasoning in collaboration with other representatives so as to reach collective agreements on how to tackle the policy issues of the day. Indeed, the diversity of views found in most pluralist societies is likely to make such compromise necessary.
Which electoral system might best achieve this result lies outside the scope of this article. However, as the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition testifies, even a plurality system can produce sufficient diversity to make compromise necessary. The argument here is that, in evaluating the democratic credentials of such compromises, it is not the policies per se that ought properly to be our focus -or that of the parties concerned when making compromises -but rather their reasoning on these policies. To the extent that this is plausibly ideas not of persons, as these are forged and expressed within the electoral process.<bni> <BI>None of the above is to deny that there may be matters that cannot be compromised. The more the cleavages within a political community are segmental and vertical, rather than cross-cutting and horizontal, the shallower compromise tends to become, and the greater the resort to trimming and segregation. Communities that are deeply divided on ethnic, cultural or religious lines tend to end up adopting ever more 'special rights' to trim issues off the agenda, and to demand the segregation of ever more decisions into autonomous decision-making bodies, such as regional assemblies or regulative authorities. 57 However, the more such devices are employed, the less the citizens involved can be said to form a democratic community -and in extreme cases may even split up, as indeed Scottish and Welsh nationalists, for example, desire. That possibility merely reinforces my central pointto accept democracy is to accept compromise. When the divisions within a political community are such that various groups can no longer compromise with each other then it is likely that they must either separate into distinct demoi or give up on democracy altogether. 
